Post by Gomux on Mar 10, 2018 20:59:24 GMT -5
The arguments in Feyerabend's Problems of Empiricism Volume 2 look very much like a Je/Pi critique of Ji/Pe methods.
Looking at them may shed some light as to how both of those cognitive styles work.
Empiricism tries to decipher universal and absolute features of reality through observation, and, critically, without reliance on tradition or other preconceptions.
This method of inquiry has a very Ji/Pe flavor.
Pe: New information comes directly from raw experience, which is a self-evident bedrock fact.
Ji: Experience can be interpreted to decipher universal and absolute features of reality.
The usual reviser refresh factor is visible here too -- any theory can be immediately tossed out if observation inclines against it.
Feyeraband contrasts this with Aristotelian philosophy, which sees experience as observation made in ordinary circumstances and interpreted in the context of existing knowledge.
This is of course a very Je/Pi view.
Je: In most situations, we can go observe things when we need to learn something.
Pi: We need to interpret these observations through an existing framework to truly make sense of them.
Here we have the more conductorish dependence upon commonsense procedures and use of existing knowledge.
This got me thinking about revisers and conductors generally.
A hypothetical thinker using only Ji would produce either a perfectly vacuous (Ti) or entirely arbitrary (Fi) mental framework. Like any of the functions, it needs to be used in tandem with another. However, not all other functions collaborate equally well with Ji. Je information is sort of "dirty" in that it comes bundled with countless ad-hoc judgement calls that can integrate poorly with Ji's lower-tolerance intellectual framework. Pi is likely to be a data overload for Ji, which is prone to try making sense of it all at once, unlike Je which will just look up the information it needs at the moment. (This partial clash between Ji and Pi may be why double introverts tend to spend inordinate amounts of mental energy on internal processing.) Only Pe truly works well with Ji because it provides a continuous supply of judgement-free data in manageable quantities. This results in the reviser form of thinking, in which unprocessed experience both sharpens and fits into a meaning-oriented abstract framework.
Je and Pi have a similar interdependence. Je's reasoning is not hyper-abstract like Ji's and requires a reasonable base of knowledge from which to make judgements. "We know this, therefore that." Pe is essentailly memoryless and therefore does not have a broad enough base of experience available at any one time for Je to use effectively. Thus, Je needs to function in tandem with Pi. The Articulator looks up data and runs counterfactual ideas through the Worldview, while the Worldview receives pre-categorized, classification-ready information whenever the Articulator makes judgement calls.
This means that Ji defaults to an attitude of interpreting or deciphering because it typically starts with low-meaning input from Pe and must make sense of it.
On the other hand, Je is accustomed to Pi so it tends to assume data is meaningful and pre-organized, focusing instead on application or extrapolation.
You can read some of the book here:
books.google.com/books/about/Problems_of_Empiricism_Volume_2.html?id=ng-l_t5rmNsC
I've also chopped some of the relevant passages into a .jpg for convenience.
Looking at them may shed some light as to how both of those cognitive styles work.
Empiricism tries to decipher universal and absolute features of reality through observation, and, critically, without reliance on tradition or other preconceptions.
This method of inquiry has a very Ji/Pe flavor.
Pe: New information comes directly from raw experience, which is a self-evident bedrock fact.
Ji: Experience can be interpreted to decipher universal and absolute features of reality.
The usual reviser refresh factor is visible here too -- any theory can be immediately tossed out if observation inclines against it.
Feyeraband contrasts this with Aristotelian philosophy, which sees experience as observation made in ordinary circumstances and interpreted in the context of existing knowledge.
This is of course a very Je/Pi view.
Je: In most situations, we can go observe things when we need to learn something.
Pi: We need to interpret these observations through an existing framework to truly make sense of them.
Here we have the more conductorish dependence upon commonsense procedures and use of existing knowledge.
This got me thinking about revisers and conductors generally.
A hypothetical thinker using only Ji would produce either a perfectly vacuous (Ti) or entirely arbitrary (Fi) mental framework. Like any of the functions, it needs to be used in tandem with another. However, not all other functions collaborate equally well with Ji. Je information is sort of "dirty" in that it comes bundled with countless ad-hoc judgement calls that can integrate poorly with Ji's lower-tolerance intellectual framework. Pi is likely to be a data overload for Ji, which is prone to try making sense of it all at once, unlike Je which will just look up the information it needs at the moment. (This partial clash between Ji and Pi may be why double introverts tend to spend inordinate amounts of mental energy on internal processing.) Only Pe truly works well with Ji because it provides a continuous supply of judgement-free data in manageable quantities. This results in the reviser form of thinking, in which unprocessed experience both sharpens and fits into a meaning-oriented abstract framework.
Je and Pi have a similar interdependence. Je's reasoning is not hyper-abstract like Ji's and requires a reasonable base of knowledge from which to make judgements. "We know this, therefore that." Pe is essentailly memoryless and therefore does not have a broad enough base of experience available at any one time for Je to use effectively. Thus, Je needs to function in tandem with Pi. The Articulator looks up data and runs counterfactual ideas through the Worldview, while the Worldview receives pre-categorized, classification-ready information whenever the Articulator makes judgement calls.
This means that Ji defaults to an attitude of interpreting or deciphering because it typically starts with low-meaning input from Pe and must make sense of it.
On the other hand, Je is accustomed to Pi so it tends to assume data is meaningful and pre-organized, focusing instead on application or extrapolation.
You can read some of the book here:
books.google.com/books/about/Problems_of_Empiricism_Volume_2.html?id=ng-l_t5rmNsC
I've also chopped some of the relevant passages into a .jpg for convenience.