On Je collectivism vs Ji universalism

They do, don't they? I'm thinking one of them, Te, is working off the premises of access to the same object, ie, two separate people from their separate perspectives are both actually looking at the same object outside themselves. What is "true" is what they can both see from their separate perspectives. So it can be asserted against each other as objectively true. It's not so much universal as it is the truth of the object in itself outside the individual's perspective. I guess this is extraversion in general.

I was thinking that Ti, like Fi, doesn't necessarily work off this same stance focussing on the object but rather on its own internal process of knowing. It is assuming on some level that this internal process works the same in everyone. It doesn't tend toward persuasion/proof to others but to itself, assuming that its reasoning process is universal and what it finds true, anyone would.

So, there's an element of the conventional to Te (and Fe) while being objective, in fact because it's object-oriented, and the opposite in Ti because it's detached but still not object-oriented. I'm thinking TE would value established fields, repeatable processes, conventional methods (actually convincing to many, not simply presumed so) etc, hence the trend towards the sciences (and IMO the Law and debate as well) because of this object-focus that makes it have "the separate other" (other people/observers/the collective) in mind as a way of subtracting singular subjective view-points. And that Ti's nihilism is because it's using a process it sees as universal logic but isn't trying to establish it (the process, not the truth) as universal in actuality.

Am I making any sense at all, Linus ?

Aqua
Myself not being a Te-user, it's hard to understand what exactly Te is for Te-users, and how that differs from my Ti (as we're both dealing with "the truth"). So my understanding is in part based on past discussions and what others have said/written. One time mikesilb and I differentiated between real-world consistency and internal consistency. We didn't say that they are exclusively divided between Te- and Ti-users respectively. Rather, we agreed that Te's primary focus is to verify 'truth' in the 'real-world', and if something is seen as real 'there', it is accepted as such by the Te-user. In contrast, Ti's primary concern is its theory, through which 'truth' in the real-world is measured. This isn't to say that Te is exclusively pragmatist or Ti exclusively theoretical, as Te-users clearly too interpret the world through theories, while Ti-users don't usually believe that only what's in their mind is true. But it does mean that Te is primarily driven to base its theories on something outside of them and so constantly gather more information to develop theory, while Ti is more content to develop and determine the validity of its theories through its self-reflection - of the theory's acquired principles against other acquired principles, even at the detriment of taking in more information. (I think Te's drive to organize the outer, which Mike describes very well here:
cognitivetype.boards.net/thread/1571/te-dominant-type
is more of an ethical imperative activated through Te, so it's not really relevant to the question of truth in itself. I'm mentioning it in case others reference this discussion and reinforce previous conceptions of Te as solely pragmatic action-orientation.)

So how does this tie into what you said?
1) "I'm thinking one of them, Te, is working off the premises of access to the same object, ie, two separate people from their separate perspectives are both actually looking at the same object outside themselves. What is "true" is what they can both see from their separate perspectives." - I think this is correct, and ties to what I said: "Te is primarily driven to base its theories on something outside of them and so constantly gather more information to develop theory". Here social agreement is indicative of external truth. It's similar to 5 people seeing a cat, 1 remembering it as black and the other 4 as white, and then being asked "It's four against one; what are the chances of only you remembering it correctly while all four of us are wrong?" (It's possible that what you said is a metaphor that I'm taking too literally. But I do think that the underlying point that Te is more concerned with concrete truth (which is "clearly" visible) is correct.)
2) "It [Ti] is assuming on some level that this internal process works the same in everyone." - This I think is also correct, and tied to my statement that "Ti is more content to develop and determine the validity of its theories through its self-reflection - of the theory's acquired principles against other acquired principles, even at the detriment of taking in more information." In giving secondary place to the objective, validity is defined by the consistency of principles. When it comes to agreement with others, in the more likely absence of reference to something external that can be accessed commonly (as Te assumes), Ti will assume that it's own methodology or set of proofs are, as you say, universal - at least in the sense of being repeatable by anybody.

So overall I'm in agreement with you, and just wanted to elaborate on some things. But I'd also like to disagree with some other things:
"I'm thinking TE would value established fields, repeatable processes, conventional methods (actually convincing to many, not simply presumed so) etc, hence the trend towards the sciences (and IMO the Law and debate as well) because of this object-focus that makes it have "the separate other" (other people/observers/the collective) in mind as a way of subtracting singular subjective view-points."
I don't think that the Te-related methodology is necessarily a way of achieving commonality and removing the subject, as after all collective agreement is still agreement among subjects. I think that the methodologies you describe above are generally good for Te because they deal with the external world; I can't apply the scientific method as well to math, by contrast. (Though I'd be curious to see how math-interested Te users view math.)
I'm saying this also because I don't think it's necessarily true that Ti is non-scientifically inclined or solipsistic. When I was 12 I was very much interested in the natural sciences, particularly physics and zoology. I was disaffected with the science taught at school because it taught science as a series of experiments producing a series of conclusions; but when studying it on my own I was interested in checking its principles and theories against each other more so than in actually experimenting. (But this is a secondary point to the paragraph above.)

"And that Ti's nihilism is because it's using a process it sees as universal logic but isn't trying to establish it (the process, not the truth) as universal in actuality."

So because Ti doesn't actually verify its methodology's universality it comes to doubt its own validity? That's an interesting thought, and probably true in some regards, but I don't think it's the primary explanation. I think Ti's nihilism problems come from problems of internal theoretical consistency, as well as the relationship between theory and reality. But I don't want to elaborate too much here because this deserves a thread of its own, and I know jelle wants to start a thread on this topic, so we'll leave this for there.

What do you think?

Hey! Gomux , are you Phib? This is fantastic!^^^ You've explained my view of things in far better terms than I ever could: I'm beginning to get jealous of that Ti/Fe ability to be succint, brief and yet so complete. You remind me of Kahawa even though mystery has shown this ability as well.

I personally agree with everything you wrote and wonder what thoughts Auburn , Linus, Kahawa , Alerith might have regarding what you wrote. mike too.